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Abstract
Mean-payoff games on timed automata are played on the infinite weighted graph of configurations
of priced timed automata between two players—Player Min and Player Max—by moving a token
along the states of the graph to form an infinite run. The goal of Player Min is to minimize the
limit average weight of the run, while the goal of the Player Max is the opposite. Brenguier,
Cassez, and Raskin recently studied a variation of these games and showed that mean-payoff
games are undecidable for timed automata with five or more clocks. We refine this result by
proving the undecidability of mean-payoff games with three clocks. On a positive side, we show
the decidability of mean-payoff games on one-clock timed automata with binary price-rates. A
key contribution of this paper is the application of dynamic programming based proof techniques
applied in the context of average reward optimization on an uncountable state and action space.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs...
1 Introduction
The classical mean-payoff games [24, 13, 15, 4] are two-player zero-sum games that are
played on weighted finite graphs, where two players—Max and Min—take turn to move a
token along the edges of the graph to jointly construct an infinite play. The objectives of the
players Max and Min are to respectively maximize and minimize the limit average reward
associated with the play. Mean-payoff games are well-studied in the context of optimal
controller synthesis in the framework of Ramadge-Wonham [22], where the goal of the game
is to find a control strategy that maximises the average reward earned during the evolution
of the system. Mean-payoff games enjoy a special status in verification, since µ-calculus
model checking and parity games can be reduced in polynomial-time to solving mean-payoff
games. Mean-payoff objectives can also be considered as quantitative extensions [16] of
classical Büchi objectives, where we are interested in the limit-average share of occurrences
of accepting states rather than merely in whether or not infinitely many accepting states
occur. For a broader discussion on quantitative verification, in general, and the transition
from the classical qualitative to the modern quantitative interpretation of deterministic
Büchi automata, we refer the reader to Henzinger’s excellent survey [16].
We study mean-payoff games played on an infinite configuration graph of timed auto-
mata. Asarin and Maler [3] were the first to study games on timed automata and they gave
an algorithm to solve timed games with reachability time objective. Their work was later
generalized and improved upon by Alur et al. [1] and Bouyer et al. [8]. Bouyer et al. [7, 5]
also studied the more difficult average payoffs, but only in the context of scheduling, which in
game-theoretic terminology corresponds to 1-player games. However, they left the problem
of proving decidability of 2-player average reward games on priced timed automata open.
Jurdziński and Trivedi [19] proved the decidability of the special case of average time games
© Guha, Jurdziński, Krishna, and Trivedi;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
ar
X
iv
:1
60
7.
08
48
0v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
8 J
ul 
20
16
XX:2 Mean-Payoff Games on Timed Automata
where all locations have unit costs. More recently, mean-payoff games on timed automata
have been studied by Brenguier, Cassez and Raskin [10] where they consider average payoff
per time-unit. Using the undecidability of energy games [9], they showed undecidability
of mean-payoff games on weighted timed games with five or more clocks. They also gave
a semi-algorithm to solve cycle-forming games on timed automata and characterized the
conditions under which a solution of these games gives a solution for mean-payoff games.
On the positive side, we characterize general conditions under which dynamic program-
ming based techniques can be used to solve the mean-payoff games on timed automata. As a
proof-of-concept, we consider one-clock binary-priced timed games, and prove the decidabil-
ity of mean-payoff games for this subclass. Our decidability result can be considered as the
average-payoff analog of the decidability result by Brihaye et al. [11] for reachability-price
games on timed automata. We strengthen the known undecidability results for mean-payoff
games on timed automata in three ways: i) we show that the mean-payoff games over priced
timed games is undecidable for timed games with only three clocks; ii) secondly, we show
that undecidability can be achieved with binary price-rates; and finally, iii) our undecidab-
ility results are applicable for problems where the average payoff is considered per move as
well as for problems when it is defined per time-unit.
Howard [17, 21] introduced gain and bias optimality equations to characterize optimal
average on one-player finite game arenas. Gain and bias optimality equations based char-
acterization has been extended to two-player game arenas [14] as well as many subclasses
of uncountable state and action spaces [12, 6]. The work of Bouyer et al. [6] is perhaps the
closest to our approach—they extended optimality equations approach to solve games on
hybrid automata with certain strong reset assumption that requires all continuous variables
to be reset at each transition, which in the case of timed automata is akin to requiring all
clocks to be reset at each transition. To the best of our knowledge, the exact decidability
for timed games does not immediately follow from any previously known results.
Howard’s Optimality equations requires two variable per state: the gain of the state and
the bias of the state. Informally speaking, the gain of a state corresponds to the optimal
mean-payoff for games starting from that state, while the bias corresponds to the limit of
transient sum of step-wise deviations from the optimal average. Hence, intuitively at a
given point in a game, both players would prefer to first optimize the gain, and then choose
to optimize bias among choices with equal gains. We give general conditions under which
a solution of gain-bias equations for a finitary abstraction of timed games can provide a
solution of gain-bias equations for the original timed game. For this purpose, we exploit a
region-graph like abstraction of timed automata [18] called the boundary region abstraction
(BRA). Our key contribution is the theorem that states that every solution of gain-bias
optimality equations for boundary region abstraction carries over to the original timed game,
as long as for every region, the gain values are constant and the bias values are affine.
The paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 2 we describe mean-payoff
games and introduce the notions of gain and bias optimality equations. This section also
introduces mean-payoff games over timed automata and states the key results of the paper.
Section 3 introduces the boundary region abstraction for timed automata and characterizes
the conditions under which the solution of a game played over the boundary region ab-
straction can be lifted to a solution of mean payoff game over priced timed automata. In
Section 4 we present the strategy improvement algorithm to solve optimality equations for
mean-payoff games played over boundary region abstraction and connect them to solution
of optimality equations over corresponding timed automata. Finally, Section 5 sketches the
undecidability of mean-payoff games for binary-priced timed automata with three clocks.
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2 Mean-Payoff Games on Timed Automata
We begin this section by introducing mean-payoff games on graphs with uncountably infinite
vertices and edges, and show how, and under what conditions, gain-bias optimality equations
characterize the value of mean-payoff games. We then set-up mean-payoff games for timed
automata and state our key contributions.
2.1 Mean-Payoff Games
I Definition 1 (Turn-Based Game Arena). A game arena Γ is a tuple (S, SMin, SMax, A, T, pi)
where S is a (potentially uncountable) set of states partitioned between sets SMin and
SMax of states controlled by Player Min and Player Max, respectively; A is a (potentially
uncountable) set of actions; T : S × A → S is a partial function called transition function;
and pi : S ×A→ R is a partial function called price function.
We say that a game arena is finite if both S and A are finite. For any state s ∈ S, we
let A(s) denote the set of actions available in s, i.e., the actions a ∈ A for which T (s, a)
and pi(s, a) are defined. A transition of a game arena is a tuple (s, a, s′) ∈ S×A×S such
that s′ = T (s, a) and we write s a−→ s′. A finite play starting at a state s0 is a sequence
of transitions 〈s0, a1, s1, a2, . . . , sn〉 ∈ S×(A×S)∗ such that for all 0 6 i < n we have that
si
ai+1−−−→ si+1 is a transition. For a finite play ρ = 〈s0, a1, . . . , sn〉 we write Last(ρ) for the
final state of ρ, here Last(ρ) = sn. The concept of an infinite play 〈s0, a1, s1, . . .〉 is defined
in an analogous way. We write Runs(s) and Runsfin(s) for the set of plays and the set of
finite plays starting at s ∈ S respectively.
A strategy of Player Min is a function µ : Runsfin → A such that µ(ρ) ∈ A(Last(ρ))
for all finite plays ρ ∈ Runsfin, i.e. for any finite play, a strategy of Min returns an action
available to Min in the last state of the play. A strategy χ of Max is defined analogously and
we let ΣMin and ΣMax denote the sets of strategies of Min and Max, respectively. A strategy
σ is positional if Last(ρ)=Last(ρ′) implies σ(ρ)=σ(ρ′) for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ Runsfin. This allows
us to represent a positional strategy as a function in [S → A]. Let ΠMin and ΠMax denote
the set of positional strategies of Min and Max, respectively. For any state s and strategy
pair (µ, χ) ∈ ΣMin×ΣMax, let Run(s, µ, χ) denote the unique infinite play 〈s0, a1, s1, . . .〉 in
which Min and Max play according to µ and χ, respectively, i.e. for all i > 0 we have that
si ∈ SMin implies ai+1 = µ(〈s0, a1, . . . , si〉) and si ∈ SMax implies ai+1 = χ(〈s0, a1, . . . , si〉).
In a mean-payoff game on a game arena, players Min and Max move a token along the
transitions indefinitely thus forming an infinite play ρ = 〈s0, a1, s1, . . .〉 in the game graph.
The goal of player Min is to minimize AMin(ρ) = lim supn→∞ 1n ·
∑n−1
i=0 pi(si, ai+1) and the
goal of player Max is to maximize AMax(ρ) = lim infn→∞ 1n ·
∑n−1
i=0 pi(si, ai+1). The upper
value Val∗(s) and the lower value Val∗(s) of a state s ∈ S are defined as:
Val∗(s) = inf
µ∈ΣMin
sup
χ∈ΣMax
AMin(Run(s, µ, χ)) and Val∗(s) = sup
χ∈ΣMax
inf
µ∈ΣMin
AMax(Run(s, µ, χ))
respectively. It is always the case that Val∗(s) 6 Val∗(s). A mean-payoff game is called
determined if for every state s ∈ S we have that Val∗(s) = Val∗(s). Then, we write Val(s) for
this number and we call it the value of the mean-payoff game at state s. We say that a game
is positionally-determined if for every ε > 0 we have strategies µε ∈ ΠMin and χε ∈ ΠMax
such that for every initial state s ∈ S, we have that
Val∗(s)−ε 6 inf
µ′∈ΣMin
AMax(Run(s, µ′, χε)) and Val∗(s)+ε > sup
χ′∈ΣMax
AMin(Run(s, µε, χ′)).
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For a given ε we call each such strategy an ε-optimal strategy for the respective player.
Given two functions G : S → R (gain) and B : S → R (bias), we say that (G,B) is a
solution to the optimality equations for mean-payoff game on Γ = (S, SMin, SMax, A, T, pi),
denoted (G,B) |= Opt(Γ) if
G(s) =
{
supa∈A(s){G(s′) : s a−→ s′} if s ∈ SMax
infa∈A(s){G(s′) : s a−→ s′} if s ∈ SMin.
B(s) =
{
supa∈A(s){pi(s, a)−G(s) +B(s′) : s a−→ s′ and G(s) = G(s′)} if s ∈ SMax
infa∈A(s){pi(s, a)−G(s) +B(s′) : s a−→ s′ and G(s) = G(s′)} if s ∈ SMin.
We prove the following theorem connecting a solution of the optimality equations with mean-
payoff games. We exploit this theorem to solve mean-payoff games on timed automata.
I Theorem 2. If there exists a function G : S → R with finite image and a function
B : S → R with bounded image such that (G,B) |= Opt(Γ) then for every state s ∈ S, we
have that G(s) = Val(s) and for every ε > 0 both players have positional ε-optimal strategies.
Proof. Assume that we are given the functions G : S → R with finite image and B : S → R
with bounded image such that (G,B) |= Opt(Γ). In order to prove the result we show, for
every ε > 0, the existence of positional strategies µε and χε such that
G(s)− ε 6 inf
µ′∈ΣMin
AMax(Run(s, µ′, χε)) and G(s) + ε > sup
χ′∈ΣMax
AMin(Run(s, µε, χ′)).
The proof is in two parts.
Given ε > 0 we compute the positional strategy µε ∈ ΠMin satisfying the following
conditions: µε(s) = a if
G(s) = G(s′) (1)
B(s) > pi(s, a)−G(s) +B(s′)− ε, (2)
where s a−→ s′. Notice that it is always possible to find such strategy since (G,B) satisfies
optimality equations and G is finite image.
Now consider an arbitrary strategy χ ∈ ΣMax and consider the run Run(s, µε, χ) =
〈s0, a1, s1, . . . , sn, . . .〉. Notice that for every i > 0 we have that G(si) > G(si+1) if
si ∈ SMax and G(si) = G(si+1) if si ∈ SMin. Hence G(s0), G(s1), . . . is a non-increasing
sequence. Since G is finite image, the sequence eventually becomes constant. Assume
that for i > N we have that G(si) = g. Now notice that for all i > N we have that
B(si) > pi(si, ai+1)− g +B(si+1) if si ∈ SMax and B(si) > pi(si, ai+1)− g +B(si+1)− ε
if si ∈ SMin. Summing these equations sidewise form i = N to N + k we have that
B(sN ) >
∑N+k
i=N pi(si, ai+1)− (k + 1) · g +B(sN+k+1)− (k + 1) · ε. Rearranging, we get
g > 1
k + 1
N+k∑
i=N
pi(si, ai+1) +
1
k + 1(B(sN+k+1)−B(sN ))− ε.
Hence g > lim sup
k→∞
1
k + 1
N+k∑
i=N
pi(si, ai+1) + lim sup
k→∞
1
k + 1(B(sN+k+1)−B(sN ))− ε
= lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
i=0
pi(si, ai+1)− ε
Hence G(s) + ε > AMin(Run(s, µε, χ)).
Since χ is an arbitrary strategy in ΣMax, we haveG(s)+ε > supχ′∈ΣMax AMin(Run(s, µε, χ′)).
This part is analogous to the first part of the proof and is omitted.
The proof is now complete. J
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2.2 Timed Automata
Priced Timed Game Arenas (PTGAs) extend classical timed automata [2] with a partition of
the actions between two players Min and Max. Before we present the syntax and semantics
of PTGAs, we need to introduce the concept of clock variables and related notions.
Clocks. Let X be a finite set of clocks. A clock valuation on X is a function ν : X→R>0 and
we write V (X ) (or just V when X is clear from the context) for the set of clock valuations.
Abusing notation, we also treat a valuation ν as a point in (R>0)|X |. Let 0 denote the clock
valuation that assigns 0 to all clocks. If ν ∈ V and t ∈ R>0 then we write ν+t for the clock
valuation defined by (ν+t)(c) = ν(c)+t for all c ∈ X . For C ⊆ X , we write νC for the
valuation where νC(c) equals 0 if c ∈ C and ν(c) otherwise. For X ⊆ V (X ), we write X
for the smallest closed set in V containing X. Although clocks are usually allowed to take
arbitrary non-negative values, for notational convenience we assume that there is a K ∈ N
such that for every c ∈ X we have ν(c) 6 K.
Clock Constraints. A clock constraint over X with upper bound K ∈ N is a conjunction
of simple constraints of the form c ./ i or c−c′ ./ i, where c, c′ ∈ X , i ∈ N, i6K, and
./ ∈ {<,>,=,6,>}. For ν ∈ V (X ) and K ∈ N, let CC(ν,K) be the set of clock constraints
with upper bound K which hold in ν, i.e. those constraints that resolve to true after
substituting each occurrence of a clock x with ν(x).
Regions and Zones. Every clock region is an equivalence class of the indistinguishability-
by-clock-constraints relation. For a given set of clocks X and upper bound K ∈ N on clock
constraints, a clock region is a maximal set ζ⊆V (X ) such that CC(ν,K)=CC(ν′,K) for all
ν, ν′ ∈ ζ. For the set of clocks X and upper boundK we writeR(X ,K) for the corresponding
finite set of clock regions. We write [ν] for the clock region of ν. A clock zone is a convex
set of clock valuations that satisfies constraints of the form γ ::= c1 ./ k | c1− c2 ./ k | γ ∧ γ,
k ∈ N, c1, c2 ∈ X and ./ ∈ {≤, <,=, >,≥}. We write Z(X ,K) for the set of clock zones
over the set of clocks X and upper bound K. When X and K are clear from the context we
write R and Z for the set of regions and zones. In this paper we fix a positive integer K,
and work with K-bounded clocks and clock constraints.
2.3 Priced Timed Game Arena: Syntax and Semantics
I Definition 3. A priced timed game arena is a tuple T=(LMin, LMax,Act,X , Inv, E, ρ, δ, p)
where LMin and LMax are sets of locations controlled by Player Min and Player Max and we
write L = LMin ∪LMax; Act is a finite set of actions; X is a finite set of clocks; Inv : L→ Z
is an invariant condition; E : L×Act → Z is an action enabledness function; ρ : Act → 2C
is a clock reset function; δ : L×Act → L is a transition function; and p : L ∪ L×Act → R is
a price information function. A PTGA is binary-priced when p(`) ∈ {0, 1} for all ` ∈ L.
When we consider a PTGA as an input of an algorithm, its size is understood as the sum of
the sizes of encodings of L, X , Inv, Act, E, ρ, δ and p. We draw the states of Min players
as circles, while states of Max player as boxes.
Let T = (LMin, LMax,Act,X , Inv, E, ρ, δ, p) be a PTGA. A configuration of a PTGA is
a pair (`, ν), where ` is a location and ν a clock valuation such that ν ∈ Inv(`). For any
t ∈ R>0, we let (`, ν)+t equal the configuration (`, ν+t). In a configuration (`, ν), a timed
action (time-action pair) (t, a) is available if and only if the invariant condition Inv(`) is
continuously satisfied while t time units elapse, and a is enabled (i.e. the enabling condition
E(`, a) is satisfied) after t time units have elapsed. Furthermore, if the timed action (t, a)
is performed, then the next configuration is determined by the transition relation δ and the
reset function ρ, i.e. the clocks in ρ(a) are reset and we move to the location δ(`, a).
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A game on a PTGA starts in an initial configuration (`, ν) ∈ L × V and players Min
and Max construct an infinite play by taking turns to choose available timed actions (t, a)
whenever the current location is controlled by them and the price p(`) · t+ p(`, a) is paid to
the Max by player Min. Formally, PTGA semantics is given as a game arena.
I Definition 4 (PTGA Semantics). Let T = (LMin, LMax,Act,X , Inv, E, ρ, δ, p) be a PTGA.
The semantics of T is given by game arena [[T]]=(S, SMin, SMax, A, T, pi) where
S ⊆ L×V is the set of states such that (`, ν) ∈ S if and only if ν ∈ Inv(`);
(`, ν) ∈ SMin (or (`, ν) ∈ SMax) if (`, ν) ∈ S and ` ∈ LMin (or ` ∈ LMax, respectively).
A = Act×R>0 is the set of timed actions;
T : S × Act → S is the transition function such that for (`, ν) ∈ S and (a, t) ∈ Act, we
have T ((`, ν), (a, t)) = (`′, ν′) if and only if
ν+t′ ∈ Inv(`) for all t′ ∈ [0, t]; ν+t ∈ E(`, a); (`′, ν′) ∈ S, δ(`, a) = `′, (ν+ t)ρ(a) = ν′.
pi : S×Act→R is the reward function where pi((`, ν), (a, t))=p(`, a) + p(`) · t.
We are interested in the mean-payoff decision problem for timed automata T that asks
to decide whether the value of the mean-payoff game for a given state is below a given
budget. For a PTGA T and budget r ∈ R, we write MPG(T, r) for the r-mean payoff
decision problem that asks whether value of the game at the state (`,0) is smaller than r.
The following theorem summarizes the key contribution of this paper.
I Theorem 5. The decision problem MPG(T, r) for binary-priced timed automata T is un-
decidable for automata with three clocks, and decidable for automata with one clock.
3 Boundary Region Graph Abstraction
In this section we introduce an abstraction of priced timed games called the boundary region
abstraction (that generalizes classical corner-point abstraction [7]), and characterize condi-
tions under which a solution of optimality equations for the boundary region abstraction can
be lifted to a solution of optimality equations for timed automata. Observe that in order to
keep our result as general as possible, we present the abstraction and corresponding results
for timed automata with an arbitrary number of clocks. In the following section, we show
that the required conditions hold for the case of one-clock binary-priced timed automata.
Timed Successor Regions. Recall that R is the set of clock regions. For ζ, ζ ′ ∈ R, we
say that ζ ′ is in the future of ζ, denoted ζ ∗−→ ζ ′, if there exist ν ∈ ζ, ν′ ∈ ζ ′ and t ∈ R>0
such that ν′ = ν+t and say ζ ′ is the time successor of ζ if ν+t′ ∈ ζ ∪ ζ ′ for all t′ 6 t and
write ζ → ζ ′, or equivalently ζ ′ ← ζ, to denote this fact. For regions ζ, ζ ′ ∈ R such that
ζ
∗−→ ζ ′ we write [ζ, ζ ′] for the zone ⋃{ζ ′′ | ζ ∗−→ ζ ′′ ∧ ζ ′′ ∗−→ ζ ′}.
Thin and Thick Regions. We say that a region ζ is thin if [ν]6=[ν+ε] for every ν ∈ ζ and
ε>0 and thick otherwise. We write RThin and RThick for the sets of thin and thick regions,
respectively. Observe that if ζ ∈ RThick then, for any ν ∈ ζ, there exists ε>0, such that
[ν]=[ν+ε] and the time successor of a thin region is thick, and vice versa.
Intuition for the Boundary Region Graph (BRG). Recall that K is an upper bound
on clock values and let JKKN = {0, 1, . . . ,K}. For any ν ∈ V , b ∈ JKKN and c ∈ X , we define
time(ν, (b, c))def=b−ν(c) if ν(c)6b, and time(ν, (b, c))def=0 if ν(c)>b. Intuitively, time(ν, (b, c))
returns the amount of time that must elapse in ν before the clock c reaches the integer value
b. Observe that, for any ζ ′ ∈ RThin, there exists b ∈ JKKN and c ∈ X , such that ν ∈ ζ
implies (ν+(b−ν(c)) ∈ ζ ′ for all ζ ∈ R in the past of ζ ′ and write ζ →b,c ζ ′. The boundary
region abstraction is motivated by the following. Consider a ∈ Act, (`, ν) and ζ ∗−→ ζ ′ such
that ν ∈ ζ, [ζ, ζ ′] ⊆ Inv(`) and ν′ ∈ E(`, a). (For illustration, see Figure 2 in Appendix).
Guha, Jurdziński, Krishna, and Trivedi XX:7
If ζ ′ ∈ RThick, then there are infinitely many t ∈ R>0 such that ν+t ∈ ζ ′. However,
amongst all such t’s, for one of the boundaries of ζ ′, the closer ν+t is to this boundary,
the ‘better’ the timed action (t, a) becomes for a player’s objective. However, since ζ ′ is a
thick region, the set {t ∈ R>0 | ν+t ∈ ζ ′} is an open interval, and hence does not contain
its boundary values. Let the closest boundary of ζ ′ from ν be defined by the hyperplane
c = binf and the farthest boundary of ζ ′ from ν be defined by the hyperplane c = bsup.
binf, bsup ∈ N are such that binf − ν(c) (bsup−ν(c)) is the infimum (supremum) of the time
spent to reach the lower (upper) boundary of region ζ ′. Let the zones that correspond
to these boundaries be denoted by ζ ′inf and ζ ′sup respectively. Then ζ →binf,c ζ ′inf → ζ ′ and
ζ →bsup,c ζ ′sup ← ζ ′. In the boundary region abstraction we include these ‘best’ timed
actions through (binf, c, a, ζ ′) and (bsup, c, a, ζ ′).
If ζ ′ ∈ RThin, then there exists a unique t ∈ R>0 such that ν+t ∈ ζ ′. Moreover since ζ ′
is a thin region, there exists a clock c ∈ C and a number b ∈ N such that ζ →b,c ζ ′ and
t = b−ν(c). In the boundary region abstraction we summarise this ‘best’ timed action
from region ζ via region ζ ′ through the action (b, c, a, ζ ′).
Based on this intuition above the boundary region abstraction (BRA) is defined as follows.
I Definition 6. For a priced timed game arena T = (LMin, LMax,Act,X , Inv, E, ρ, δ, p) the
boundary region abstraction of T is given by the game arena T̂ = (Ŝ, ŜMin, ŜMax, Â, T̂ , pi)
Ŝ ⊆ L×V×R is the set of states such that (`, ν, ζ) ∈ Ŝ if and only if ζ ⊆ Inv(`) and
ν ∈ ζ (recall that ζ denotes the closure of ζ);
(`, ν, ζ) ∈ ŜMin (or (`, ν, ζ) ∈ ŜMax) if (`, ν, ζ) ∈ Ŝ and ` ∈ LMin (or ` ∈ LMax, resp.).
Â = (JKKN×X×Act×R) is the set of actions;
For sˆ=(`, ν, ζ)∈Ŝ and α=(bα, cα, aα, ζα)∈Â, function T̂ (sˆ, α) is defined if [ζ, ζα]⊆Inv(`)
and ζα ⊆ E(`, aα) and it equals (`′, ν′, ζ ′) ∈ Ŝ where δ(`, aα) = `′, να[C:=0] = ν′ and
ζα[C:=0] = ζ ′ with να = ν+time(ν, (bα, cα)) and one of the following conditions holds:
ζ →bα,cα ζα; ζ →bα,cα ζinf → ζα for some ζinf ∈ R; ζ →bα,cα ζsup ← ζα for some ζsup ∈ R;
for (`, ν, ζ) ∈ Ŝ and (bα, cα, aα, ζα) ∈ Â the reward function pi is given by:
pi((`, ν, ζ), (bα, cα, aα, ζα)) = p(`, aα) + p(`) · (bα−ν(cα))
Although the boundary region abstraction is not a finite game arena, every state has
only finitely many time-successor (the boundaries of the regions) and for a fixed initial state
we can restrict attention to a finite game arena due to the following observation.
I Lemma 7 ( [23].). Let T be a priced timed game arena and T̂ the corresponding BRA. For
any state of T̂, its reachable sub-graph is finite and can be constructed in time exponential in
the size of T when T has more than one clock. For one clock T, the reachable sub-graph of
T̂ can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of T. Moreover, the reachable sub-graph
from the initial location and clock valuation is precisely the corner-point abstraction.
3.1 Reduction to Boundary Region Abstraction
In what follows, unless specified otherwise, we fix a PTGA T = (LMin, LMax,Act,X , Inv, E, ρ, δ, p)
with semantics [[T]]=(S, SMin, SMax, A, T, pi) and BRA T̂ = (Ŝ, ŜMin, ŜMax, Â, T̂ , pi). Let
G : Ŝ → R and B : Ŝ → R be such that (G,B) |= Opt(T̂), i.e. for every sˆ ∈ Ŝ we have that
G(sˆ) =
maxα∈Â(sˆ){G(sˆ′) : sˆ
α−→ sˆ′} if sˆ ∈ ŜMax
min
α∈Â(sˆ){G(sˆ′) : sˆ
α−→ sˆ′} if sˆ ∈ ŜMin.
B(sˆ) =
maxα∈Â(sˆ){pi(sˆ, α)−G(sˆ) +B(sˆ′) : sˆ
α−→ sˆ′ and G(sˆ) = G(sˆ′)} if sˆ ∈ ŜMax
min
α∈Â(sˆ){pi(sˆ, α)−G(sˆ) +B(sˆ′) : sˆ
α−→ sˆ′ and G(sˆ) = G(sˆ′)} if sˆ ∈ ŜMin.
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For a function F : Ŝ → R we define a function F : S → R as (`, ν) 7→ F (`, ν, [ν]).
In this section we show under what conditions we can lift a solution (G,B) of optimality
equations of BRA to (G, B) for priced timed game arena. Given a set of valuations
X⊆V , a function f : X → R>0 is affine if for any valuations νx, νy ∈ X we have that for all
λ ∈ [0, 1], f(λνx+(1−λ)νy) = λf(νx)+(1−λ)f(νy). We say that a function f : Ŝ → R>0 is
regionally affine if f(`, ·, ζ) is affine over a region for all ` ∈ L and ζ ∈ R, and f is regionally
constant if f(`, ·, ζ) is constant over a region for all ` ∈ L and ζ ∈ R. Some properties of
affine functions that are useful in the proof of the key lemma are given in Lemma 8.
I Lemma 8. Let X ⊆ V and Y ⊆ R>0 be convex sets. Let f : X → R and w : X × Y → R
be affine functions. Then for C ⊆ X we have that φC(ν, t) = w(ν, t) + f((ν + t)[C:=0]) is
also an affine function, and inft1<t<t2 φC(ν, t) = min{φC(ν, t1), φC(ν, t2)} and
supt1<t<t2 φC(ν, t) = max{φC(ν, t1), φC(ν, t2)}, φ is the unique continuous closure of φ.
I Theorem 9. Let G : Ŝ → R and B : Ŝ → R are such that (G,B) |= Opt(T̂) and G is
regionally constant and B is regionally affine, then (G, B) |= Opt(T).
Proof. We need to show that (G, B) |= Opt(T), i.e. for every
G(s) =

sup
(t,a)∈A(s)
{G(s′) : s (t,a)−−−→ s′} if s ∈ SMax
inf
(t,a)∈A(s)
{G(s′) : s (t,a)−−−→ s′} if s ∈ SMin.
B(s) =

sup
(t,a)∈A(s)
{pi(s, (t, a))−G(s)+B(s′) : s (t,a)−−−→ s′ and G(s) = G(s′)} if s ∈ SMax
inf
(t,a)∈A(s)
{pi(s, (t, a))−G(s)+B(s′) : s (t,a)−−−→ s′ and G(s) = G(s′)} if s ∈ SMin.
Consider the case when s = (`, ν) ∈ SMin and consider the right side of the gain equations.
inf
(t,a)∈A(s)
{G(s′) : s (t,a)−−−→ s′}
= min
ζ′′:[ν]→∗ζ′′
[ζ,ζ′′]∈Inv(`)
min
a∈Act
inf
t :
ν+t∈ζ′′
{G(δ(`, a), (ν+t)[ρ(a):=0], [(ν+t)][ρ(a):=0])}
= min
α∈Â(`,ν,[ν])
{G(`′, ν′, ζ ′) : (`, ν, ζ) α−→ (`′, ν′, ζ ′)} = G(`, ν, [ν]) = G(`, ν).
The first equality holds since (G,B) |= Opt(T̂). The second equality follows since G is
regionally constant and hence it suffices to consider the delay time(ν, (b, c)) that corresponds
to either left or right boundary of the region ζ ′′, i.e. for fixed ν, ζ ′′ and a ∈ Act we have that
inf t :
ν+t∈ζ′′
{G(`′, (ν + t)[ρ(a):=0], ζ ′)} = G(`′, να[C:=0], ζ ′) where να = ν+time(ν, (bα, cα)),
ζ ′′[C:=0] = ζ ′ with ζ →bα,cα ζ ′′ if ζ ′′ is thin, and ζ →bα,cα ζinf → ζ ′′ for some ζinf ∈ R if ζ ′′
is thick. Similarly, for the bias equations, we need to show:
inf
t :
ν+t∈ζ′′
{pi((`, ν), (t, a))−G(`, ν) +B(`′, (ν + t)[ρ(a):=0], ζ ′)}
= pi((`, ν, [ν]), (time(ν, (bα, cα))))−G(`, ν, [ν]) +B(`′, να[C:=0], ζ ′)
where να = ν+time(ν, (bα, cα)), ζ ′′[C:=0] = ζ ′ with ζ →bα,cα ζ ′′ if ζ ′′ is thin; and ζ →bα,cα
ζinf → ζ ′′ for some ζinf ∈ R or ζ →bα,cα ζsup → ζ ′′ for some ζsup ∈ R if ζ ′′ is thick. Given B
is regionally affine (and hence linear in t) and the price function is linear in t, the whole
expression pi((`, ν), (t, a))−G(`, ν)+B(`′, (ν+t)[ρ(a):=0], ζ ′) is linear in t and from Lemma 8
it attains its infimum or supremum on either boundary of the region. J
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4 Decidability for One Clock Binary-priced PTGA
Given the undecidability with 3 or more clocks, we focus on one clock PTGA. We provide
a strategy improvement algorithm to compute a solution G : Ŝ → R and B : Ŝ → R of
the optimality equations, i.e. (G,B) |= Opt(T̂) for the BRA T̂ = (Ŝ, ŜMin, ŜMax, Â, T̂ , pi) of
one-clock binary-priced PTGAs with certain “integral payoff” restriction. Further, we show
that for one clock binary-priced integral-payoff PTGA, the solution of optimality equations
of corresponding BRG is such that the gains are regionally constant and biases are regionally
affine. Hence by Theorem 9, the algorithm can be applied to solve mean-payoff games for
one-clock binary-priced integral-payoff PTGAs. We also show how to lift the integral-payoff
restriction to recover decidability for one-clock binary-priced PTGA.
Regionally constant positional strategies. Standard strategy improvement algorithms
iterate over a finite set of strategies such that the value of the subgame at each itera-
tion gets strictly improved. However, since there are infinitely many positional strategies
in a boundary region abstraction, we focus on “regionally constant” positional strategies
(RCPSs). We say that a positional strategy µ : Ŝ → Â of player Min is regionally-constant
if for all (`, ν, ζ), (`, ν′, ζ) ∈ ŜMin we have that [ν]=[ν′] implies that µ(`, ν, ζ) = µ(`, ν′, ζ).
We similarly define RCPSs for player Max. In other words, in an RCPS a player chooses
same boundary action for every valuation of a region—as a side-result we show that optimal
strategies for both players have this form. Observe that there are finitely many RCPSs for
both players. We write Π̂Min and Π̂Max for the set of RCPSs for player Min and player
Max, respectively. For a BRA T̂, χ ∈ Π̂Max, and µ ∈ Π̂Min we write T̂(χ) and T̂(µ) for the
“one-player” game on the sub-graph of BRAs where the strategies of player Max and Min
have been fixed to RCPSs χ and µ, respectively. Similarly we define the zero-player game
T̂(µ, χ) where strategies of both players are fixed to RCPSs µ and χ.
Let T̂(χ, µ) be a zero-player game on the subgraph where strategies of player Max (and
Min) is fixed to RCPSs χ (and µ). Observe that for T̂(µ, χ) the unique runs originating
from states sˆ0 = (`, ν, ζ) and sˆ′0 = (`, ν′, ζ) with [ν] = [ν′] follow the same “lasso” after
one step, i.e. the unique runs sˆ0
α1−→ sˆ1 · · · sˆk( αk+1−−−→ · · · sˆk+N−1 αk+N−−−−→ sˆk)∗ and sˆ′0 α1−→
sˆ′1 · · · sˆ′k(
αk+1−−−→ · · · sˆ′k+N−1
αk+N−−−−→ sˆ′k)∗ are such that for sˆi = (`i, νi, ζi) and sˆ′i = (`′i, ν′i, ζ ′i)
we have that `i = `′i, ζi = ζ ′i and νi = ν′i for all i ∈ [1, k+N−1]. This is so because for one-
clock timed automata the successors of the states sˆ0 = (`, ν, ζ) and sˆ′0 = (`, ν′, ζ) for action
α1 = (b, c, a, ζ ′) is the same (`′′, ν′′, ζ ′′) where ν′′(c) = ν(c)+(b−ν(c)) = b = ν(c)+(b−ν(c))
if c 6∈ ρ(a) and ν′′(c) = 0 otherwise. Consider the optimality equations (Section C.3) for the
lasso. Observe that the gain for the states sˆ0, . . . , sˆk+N−1 is the same, and let’s call it g. If
we add the bias equations side-wise for the cycle, we get g = 1N
∑N−1
i=0 pi(sˆk+i, αk+i+1). It
follows from the previous observation that the gains are regionally constant.
Integral Payoff PTGA. The gain in a zero-player game, T̂(χ, µ), although regionally-
constant, may not be a whole number. We say that a PTGA is integral-payoff if for every
pair (µ, χ) ∈ Π̂Min × Π̂Max of RCPSs the gain as defined above is a whole number. Observe
that the denominator in the gains correspond to the number of edges in a simple cycle of the
BRA T̂. If there are N simple cycles in the region graph of length n1, n2 . . . , nN , then let
L be the least-common multiple of n1, n2 . . . , nN . We multiply constants appearing in the
guards and invariants of the timed automata by L. It is easy to observe that mean-payoff
of any state in the original PTGA T is the mean-payoff in ΥT divided by L. For notational
convenience, we assume that the given PTGA is an integral-payoff PTGA and hence for
RCPS strategy profile (µ, χ) the gain is regionally constant and integral.
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Algorithm 1: ComputeValueZeroPlayer(T, µ, χ)
1 Consider T̂(µ, χ) as a (single successor) weighted graph G = (V,E,w) where
V = L×R×R (with an order ) and E ⊆ V × Â× V
(v1, α, v2) ∈ E if v1 = (`1, ζ1, ζ ′1), v2 = (`2, ζ2, ζ ′2), and µ(`1, ν1, ζ ′1) = α (or
χ(`1, ν1, ζ ′1) = α) for all ν1 ∈ ζ1 and (`1, ν1, ζ ′1) α−→ (`1, ν2, ζ ′2) for some ν2 ∈ ζ2.
w(v1, α, v2) is the expression ν 7→ bα − ν(cα);
for every cycle C of G do
Let Reach(C) be set of vertices that reach C;
Let γ be the average weight of the cycle (w is constant on cycles);
For every vertex V in Reach(C) set G(V ) = γ and B(V ) = ⊥;
For the smallest -vertex V∗ in C. Set B(V∗) = 0;
while there is V ∈ Reach(C) with B(V ) = ⊥ do
Let (V ′, α, V ′′) ∈ E with B(V ′′) 6= ⊥;
B(V ′) := ν 7→ (w(V ′, α, V ′′)(ν)−G+B(V ′′));
return (G,B);
4.1 Strategy Improvement Algorithm for Binary-Priced PTGA
Let T be a one-clock integral-payoff binary-priced PTGA T and T̂ be its boundary region
graph. For a given RCPS profile (µ, χ) ∈ Π̂Min×Π̂Max, Algorithm 1 computes the solution for
the optimality equations Opt(T(µ, χ)). This algorithm considers T̂(µ, χ) as a graph whose
vertices are “regions” (`, [ν], ζ) corresponding to state (`, ν, ζ) ∈ Ŝ of the boundary region
graph, edges are boundary actions between them determined by the regionally constant
strategy profile, and weight of an edge is the time function associated with the boundary
action. Observe that every cycle in this graph will have constant weight on the edges since
taking boundary actions in a loop will require going from an integral valuation to another
integral valuation, and the average cost of such a cycle can be easily computed.
Also observe that, not unlike standard convention [21], our algorithm chooses a vertex
in a cycle arbitrarily and fixes the bias of all of the states in that vertex to 0. This is
possible since optimality equations over a cycle are underdetermined, and we exploit this
flexibility to achieve solution to biases in a particularly “simple” structure. We say that a
function f : Ŝ → R>0 is regionally simple [3] if for all ` ∈ L, ζ, ζ ′ ∈ R either i) there exists
a d ∈ N such that f(`, ν, ζ ′) = d for all ν ∈ ζ; or ii) there exists d ∈ N and c ∈ X such that
f(`, ν, ζ ′) = d− ν(c) for all ν ∈ ζ. Key properties of regionally simple functions (Lemma 20
in Appendix C.2) include that they are also regionally affine, closed under minimum and
maximum, and if B : Ŝ → R be a regionally simple function and G : sˆ→ N be a regionally
constant function, then sˆ 7→ pi(sˆ, α) − G(sˆ) + B(sˆ′) where sˆ α−→ sˆ′ is a regionally simple
function. Using these properties and induction on the distance to -minimal element in the
reachable cycle, we prove the correctness and following property of Algorithm 1.
I Lemma 10. Algorithm 1 computes solution of optimality equations (G,B) |= Opt(T̂(µ, χ))
for µ ∈ Π̂Min and χ ∈ Π̂Max. Moreover, G is regionally constant and B is regionally simple.
The strategy improvement algorithm to solve optimality equations is given as Algorithm 2.
It begins by choosing an arbitrary regionally constant positional strategy χ′ and at every
iteration of the loop (2–11) the algorithm computes (5–9) the value (G,B) of the current
RCPS χ and based on the value, the function ImproveMaxStrategy returns an improved
strategy by picking boundary action that lexicographically maximizes gain and bias respect-
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Algorithm 2: ComputeValueTwoPlayer(T)
1 Choose an arbitrary regionally constant positional strategy χ′ ∈ ΠMax;
2 repeat
3 χ := χ′;
4 Choose an arbitrary regionally constant positional strategy µ′ ∈ ΠMin;
5 repeat
6 µ := µ′;
7 (G,B) := ComputeValueZeroPlayer(T, µ, χ) ;
8 µ′ := ImproveMinStrategy(T, µ,G,B) ;
9 until µ = µ′;
10 χ′ := ImproveMaxStrategy(T, χ,G,B) ;
11 until χ = χ′;
12 return (G,B);
ing the policy that switches a decision only for a strict improvement. We formally define
the function ImproveMaxStrategy as follows: for χ∈Σ̂Max, G : Ŝ→R, and B : Ŝ→R we
let strategy ImproveMaxStrategy(T, χ,G,B) be such that for all sˆ ∈ ŜMax we have
ImproveMaxStrategy(T, χ,G,B)(sˆ) =
{
χ(sˆ) if χ(sˆ) ∈M∗(sˆ, G,B)
Choose(M∗(sˆ, G,B)) Otherwise.
where M∗(sˆ, G,B) = argmaxlex
α∈Â{(G(sˆ′), pi(sˆ, α) − G(sˆ) + B(sˆ′)) : sˆ
α−→ sˆ′} and Choose
picks an arbitrary element from a set. ImproveMaxStrategy satisfies the following.
I Lemma 11. If χ ∈ Π̂Max, G is regionally constant, and B is regionally simple, then func-
tion ImproveMaxStrategy(T, χ,G,B) returns a regionally constant positional strategy.
The lines (5–9) compute the value of the strategy χ of Player Max via a strategy improve-
ment algorithm. This sub-algorithm works by starting with an arbitrary strategy of Player
Min and computing the value (G,B) of the zero-player PTGA T̂(µ, χ). Based on the value,
the function ImproveMinStrategy returns an improved strategy of Min. The function
ImproveMinStrategy is defined as a dual of the function ImproveMaxStrategy where
χ is replaced by µ and argmax by argmin. ImproveMinStrategy satisfies the following.
I Lemma 12. If µ ∈ Π̂Min, G is regionally constant, and B is regionally simple, then func-
tion ImproveMinStrategy(T, χ,G,B) returns a regionally constant positional strategy.
It follows from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 that at every iteration of the strategy improvement
the strategies µ and χ are RCPSs. Together with finiteness of the set of RCPSs and strict
improvement at every step (Lemma 21 and 22), we get following result.
I Theorem 13. Algorithm 2 computes solution of optimality equations (G,B) |= Opt(T̂) for
integral payoff PTGA T. Moreover, G is regionally constant and B is regionally affine.
This theorem—together with Theorem 9 and Theorem 2—gives a proof of decidability for
mean-payoff games for integral-payoff binary-priced one-clock timed automata.
5 Undecidability Results
I Theorem 14. The mean-payoff problem MPG(T, r) is undecidable for PTGA T with 3
clocks having location-wise price-rates pi(`) ∈ {0, 1,−1} for all ` ∈ L and r = 0. Moreover,
it is undecidable for binary-priced T with 3 clocks and r >= 0.
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Figure 1 Simulation to decrement counter C1, mean cost is ε for error ε. The widget WD12 has
exactly the same structure and guards on all transitions as WD11, but the price signs are reversed.
Proof. We first show the undecidability result of the mean-payoff problem MPG(T, 0) with
location prices {1, 0,−1} and no edge prices. We prove the result by reducing the non-
halting problem of 2 counter machines. Our reduction uses a PTGA with 3 clocks x1, x2, x3,
location prices {1, 0,−1}, and no edge prices. Each counter machine instruction (increment,
decrement, zero check) is specified using a PTGA module. The main invariant in our
reduction is that on entry into any module, we have x1 = 15c17c2 , x2 = 0 and x3 = 0, where
c1, c2 are the values of counters C1, C2. We outline the construction for the decrement
instruction of counter C1 in Figure 1. For conciseness, we present here modules using
arbitrary location prices. However, we can redraw these with extra locations and edges
using only the location prices from {1, 0,−1} as shown for WD11 in Figure 5 in Appendix.
The role of the Min player is to faithfully simulate the two counter machine, by choosing
appropriate delays to adjust the clocks to reflect changes in counter values. Player Max will
have the opportunity to verify that player Min did not cheat while simulating the machine.
We enter location `k with x1 = 15c17c2 , x2 = 0 and x3 = 0. Lets denote by xold the value
1
5c17c2 . To correctly decrement C1, player Min should choose a delay of 4xold at location `k.
At location Check, there is no time elapse and player Max has three possibilities : (i) to go
to `k+1 and continue the simulation, or (ii) to enter the widget WD11, or (iii) to enter the
widget WD12. If player Min makes an error, and delays 4xold + ε or 4xold − ε at `k (ε > 0),
then player Max can enter one of the widgets and punish player Min. Player Max enters
widget WD11 if the error made by player Min is of the form 4xold+ ε at `k and enters widget
WD12 if the error made by player Min is of the form 4xold − ε at `k.
Let us examine the widget WD11. When we enter WD11 for the first time, we have
x1 = xold + 4xold + ε, x2 = 4xold + ε and x3 = 0. In WD11, the cost of going once from
location A to E is 5ε. Also, when we get back to A after going through the loop once, the
clock values with which we entered WD11 are restored; thus, each time, we come back to A,
we restore the starting values with which we enter WD11. The third clock is really useful for
this purpose only. It can be seen that the mean cost of transiting from A to A through E is
ε. In a similar way, it can be checked that the mean cost of transiting from A to A through
E in widget WD12 is ε when player Min chooses a delay 4xold − ε at `k. Thus, if player Min
makes a simulation error, player Max can always choose to goto one of the widgets, and
ensure that the mean pay-off is not 6 0. Note that when ε = 0, then player Min will achieve
his objective: the mean pay-off will be 0. Details of other gadgets are in Appendix D.1. J
In the Appendix D.2, we show how this undecidability results extends (with the same
parameters) if one defines mean payoff per time unit instead of per step. This way of
averaging across time spent was considered in [10], where the authors show the undecidability
ofMPG(T, 0) with 5 clocks. We improve this result to show undecidability already in 3 clocks.
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Appendix
A Supplementary material to Section 2
A.1 Strategy improvement algorithm for Finite Game Arenas
Let Γ be a finite game arena. For technical convenience let us fix an arbitrary but fixed
linear order  ⊆ S2 on the set of states S. For a positional strategy χ ∈ ΠMax we write Γχ
for the subgame of Γ where the outgoing transitions from the states controlled by Player
Max have been restricted to the ones allowed by χ. We similarly define Γµ and Γχµ.
Strategy Improvement Algorithm for Finite Game Arenas. The strategy improve-
ment algorithm to compute s solution of optimality equations works as follows.
1. Fix an arbitrary positional strategy χ : SMax → A for player Max.
2. (Best counter-strategy against χ.) Compute the best counter-strategy µ for player Min
against the strategy χ by performing the following steps.
a. (Minimize gain.) For every state s ∈ S, let G(s) be the value of the minimum average
weight of a cycle reachable from the state s in the strategy subgame Γχ; let C(s)
denote such a cycle reachable from the state s. Let ms be the -smallest state on the
cycle C(s). Let Ws be the set of states s′, such that ms′ = ms, i.e., the set of states
which have the same reachable minimum average weight cycle in the graph Γχ as the
state s.
b. (Minimize bias.) For every state s ∈ S, let B(s) be the weight of the shortest path
from the state s to the state ms in the subgraph of Γχ induced by the set of states
Ws, and where G(s) was subtracted from the price of every transition in the subgraph
Γχ. For every state s ∈ SMin, set µ(s) to be the state s′ ∈ V , such that s a−→ s′ for
some a , s′ ∈Ws (and hence G(s) = G(s′)), and B(s) = (pi(s, a)−G(s)) +B(s′).
Observe that the functions G and B thus obtained satisfy the optimality equations for
the subgame Γχ. However, these function may not satisfy the optimality equations for
the original game Γ. The next step “locally” changes the strategy χ, intuitively in order
to make progress towards computing the optimality equations.
3. (Local improvement of strategy χ.) For every state s ∈ SMax, set χ(s) to be a successor
s′ of the state s, which first maximizes G(s′) and then maximizes B(s′). In other words,
χ(s) is the successor s′ of the state s which maximizes (G(s′), B(s′)) according to the
lexicographical ordering on pairs, where we use the usual ordering on the reals in both
coordinates. Importantly, if the current χ-successor of the state s is already maximum in
the above lexicographic sense, χ(s) remains unchanged, even if there are other successors
s′ of s with the same pair of values (G(s′), B(s′)) as the state χ(s). This assumption is
important for finite termination of the strategy improvement algorithm.
4. If the local improvement of the strategy χ in the previous step resulted in a change of χ
in at least one state then go back to step 2. Otherwise stop.
We establish the following two fundamental properties of the iterative scheme of strategy
improvement described above. The first observation that a locally optimal strategy yields a
solution to optimality equations is straightfoward to check.
I Lemma 15 (OE Solution from a locally optimal strategy). If the algorithm stops then the
tuple (G,B) computed in the last iteration is a solution to optimality equations.
Next, we show that in every non-terminating iteration of the algorithm, the pair (G,B)
consisting of the gain function G and the bias function B, that are uniquely determined from
the current pair of strategies χ and µ, strictly increases according to a certain linear ordering
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as a result of the local improvement. This implies finite termination of the algorithm, since
there are only finitely many positional strategies. Thus, together with Lemma 15, we get
the existence of an OE Solution, which establishes positional determinacy of mean-payoff
games on finite game arenas.
I Theorem 16 (Strict global improvement from myopic improvement). Let µ (µ′) be the best
counter-strategy for player Min against a strategy χ (χ′) for player Max, and let G (G′) and
B (B′) be as computed in step 2 of an iteration of the algorithm starting from the strategy
χ (χ′.) If the strategy χ′ is a non-trivial local improvement of the strategy χ, as computed
in step 3 of the algorithm, then for every state s ∈ S, the following hold.
1. We have G′(s) > G(s).
2. If G′(s) = G(s) then B′(s) > B(s).
3. If s∈SMax and χ′(s) 6=χ(s) then either G′(s)>G(s), or G′(s)=G(s) and B′(s)>B(s).
Proof. In order to verify property 1 it suffices to show that the average weight of every
cycle reachable from a state s in the strategy subgraph Γχ′ is no smaller than the smallest
average weight of a cycle reachable from the state s in the strategy subgraph Γχ. First,
observe that for every transition (s, a, s′) in the subgraph of the graph Γχ′ , we have the
inequality G(s) 6 G(s′). It implies in Γχ′ we have that G(s) is smaller than average of the
cheapest reachable cycle. On the other hand G′(s) is the average of the cheapest cycle in
Γχ′ . It follows that G(s) 6 G(s′).
Now we argue that the properties 2 and 3 hold. From the assumption that G′(s) = G(s)
it follows that the paths from the state s in graphs Γχµ and Γχ′µ′ lead to the same cycle.
We need to prove that B′(s) > B(s) and that χ′(s) 6= χ(s) implies B′(s) > B(s).
First, observe that for every transition (s, a, s′) in the subgraph of the graph Γχ induced
by the set of states Ws, we have the inequality B(s) 6 (pi(s, a)−G(s)) +B(s′); it follows by
the construction of B as the weights of shortest paths to the state s (step 2(b)). Moreover,
by the definition of the myopic improvement of the strategy χ (step 3), for every transition
(s, a, s′) in the subgraph of the graph Γχ′ induced by the set of states W ′s, we have B(s) 6
(pi(s, a)−G(s)) +B(s′).
Now let 〈s = s0, a1, s1, . . . , sp = mv〉 be a path from the state s to the state ms in
the subgraph of the graph Γχ′ induced by the set of states W ′s. Then adding the p in-
equalities B(si) 6 (pi(si, ai+1) − G(si)) + B(si+1), for i = 0, 1, . . . , p − 1, we get that
B(s) 6
∑p−1
i=0 (pi(si, ai+1) − G(s)). This, however, implies that B(s) 6 B′(s), since if the
previous inequality holds for all the paths from s to ms in the appropriate subgraph of Γχ′ ,
then it also holds for the shortest such. This establishes property 2. Property 3 now follows
from the strictness of the inequality B(s0) < (pi(s0, a1)−G(s0)) +B(s1) if we assume that
χ′(s) 6= χ(s). Note that this is when the assumption at the end of step 3 is necessary to
avoid looping without strict improvement of neither the gain nor the bias function from one
iteration of the algorithm to another. J
B Boundary Region Abstraction: Illustration
A PTGA is shown at the top of Figure 2. A sub-graph of BRA reachable from (`0, (0.3, 0.1), 0<y<x<1)
is shown below the PTGA in the same figure. The names of the regions correspond
to the regions depicted in the bottom right corner. Edges are labelled (a, c, b, ζ) and
the intuitive meaning is to wait until clock c reaches the value b in the boundary of
the region ζ. Considering the region ζ1, we see that it is determined by the constraints
(1<x<2)∧(0<y<1)∧(y<x−1). The bold numbers on edges correspond to the time delay be-
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`0x,y≤2 `1
(0<y≤2)∧(x≤2)
b, x>1, x:= 0
(`0, (0.3, 0.1), ζ0)
(`1, (0, 0.8), ζ6)
(`1, (0, 1.8), ζ8)
(`1, (0, 1), ζ6)
(`1, (0, 1), ζ7)
(`1, (0, 1), ζ8)
(b, x, 1, ζ1);0.7
(b, x, 2, ζ3);1.7
(b, x, 2, ζ4);1.7
(b, x, 2, ζ4);1.7
(b, y, 1, ζ1);0.9
(b, y, 1, ζ2);0.9
((b, y, 1, ζ2);0.9
((b, y, 1, ζ3);0.9 ζ0
ζ1
ζ2
ζ3 ζ4
ζ5 ζ6
ζ7
ζ8 ζ9
ζ100
0
1
2
1 2x
y
Figure 2 Sub-graph of the boundary region abstraction for the PTGA with the region names as
depicted in the bottom right corner.
fore the action labelling the edge is taken. Figure 2 includes the actions available in the initial
state and one of the action pairs that are available in the state (`1, (0, 1), (x=0)∧(1<y<2)).
C Proofs from Section 4
C.1 Examples of PTGAs with non-affine Bias Functions
I Example 17. Consider the timed game shown in Figure 3. All the locations here belong
to the player Min. There are two cycles in which the gains or the average weight of the
cycles is 12 . If corresponding to two or more strategies, the gains are the same, then the
strategy that minimizes the bias is chosen by the player Min. The bias B(s) of a player Min
state s = (`, ν) where ` is a location of the priced timed game and ν is a clock valuation is
given by inf
(t,a)∈A(s)
{pi(s, (t, a))−G(s)+B(s′) : s (t,a)−−−→ s′ and G(s) = G(s′)} if s ∈ SMin. The
inf is replaced by a sup for a player Max state. G(s) denotes the gain of state s. Considering
the bias of the states (`2, ν) and (`5, ν) to be 0, the bias of a state (`1, ν) turns out to be
1
2 − νx when the edge (`1 → `2) is considered and the bias of (`1, ν) is the constant function
−1 when the edge (`1 → `4) is considered. Here νx denotes the value of clock x. For x > 32 ,
the value of 12 − νx is smaller than −1 and hence the edge (`1 → `4) is chosen while the
edge (`1 → `2) is chosen when x ≤ 32 . Thus the bias is not regionally affine. This can be
attributed to the fact that the gain is not integral.
I Example 18. Let us consider another example of one-clock priced timed games with three
price rates: 0, 1 and −1 shown in Figure 4. The value of the game is 14 which is obtained by
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0
0
1
1
`1
`5
`2
`4
`3
1 < x
< 2
x < 2
{x}
x = 1, {x}
{x}
x = 1, {x}
Figure 3 One clock PTGA with binary
prices may not have regionally simple bias.
0
1
1
−1
`1 `2
`3
`4
x < 1
x < 1, {x}
x < 1 x < 1
x = 1, {x}
Figure 4 One clock PTGA with non-
binary prices. The ε-optimal strategies of Min
and Max players are not regionally positional
boundary strategies and the value of the game
is 14 .
the following sequence of moves by both players. From the initial state (`1, x = 0), player
Min waits at `1 for 0.5 time units and then moves the token to location `2. player Max
moves the token to `4 immediately and subsequently the token reaches `1 with the value of
clock x = 1 − δ, where δ is an infintesimal positive quantity. The token is forwarded to `2
now instantaneously or after an infintesimal delay so that the value of clock x is still less
than 1. player Max now forwards the token to `3 when the value of clock x becomes 1. At
location `3, 1 − δ amount of time is elapsed. In the next move of player Max, the token
reaches the initial state (`1, x = 0). The ε-optimal strategies of both Min and player Max
are not regionally constant boundary strategies.
I Lemma 19. In one clock binary non-integral payoff PTGA the bias may not be regionally
affine. The same is true for for the BRA of the PTGA.
Proof. Consider the example in Figure 3. There are two loops, one consisting of locations
`2 and `3 and the other one with locations `4 and `5. For the states (`2, ν) and (`3, ν) where
ν is any valuation of clock x, the gain g equals 12 . For the states (`4, ν) and (`5, ν) such that
νx ≤ 1 also have their gain g equal to 12 . Hence the corresponding PTGA is a non-integral
payoff one. Note that all the states in the non-integral payoff PTGA in Figure 3 belong to
the player Min. Since the gains corresponding to both the loops are the same, the optimal
strategy of the player Min from a state (`1, ν) is determined by the bias of a successor state.
We now show that the bias of a state (`1, ν) may not be regionally affine. For computing
the bias in the loop consisting of the locations `2 and `3, let us consider that B(`2, ν) = 0.
Thus considering the successor state of a state (`1, ν) to be the state (`2, ν + t), we have
B(`1, ν) = inf
t:1<ν+t<2
t− g +B(`2, ν + t)
= inf
t:1−ν<t<2−ν
t− 12 + 0 = 1− ν −
1
2 =
1
2 − ν.
In the loop consisting of locations `4 and `5, let B(`5, ν) = 0. Now
B(`4, ν) = inf
t
t− g +B(`5, 0) = 0− 12 + 0 = −
1
2 .
Thus considering the successor state of a state (`1, ν) to be the state (`4, ν + t), we have
B(`1, ν) = inf
t:0≤t<2
t− g +B(`4, ν + t) = 0− 12 −
1
2 = −1.
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Hence the bias at (`1, ν) is given by min( 12 − νx,−1). This gives us that the edge `1 → `2
is chosen when x ≤ 32 , while the edge `1 → `4 is chosen when x > 32 . Hence the bias of
location `1 is not regionally affine in non-integral payoff PTGA. It is easy to see that the
lemma also holds for the BRA on the PTGA. J
C.2 Regionally Simple Functions: Properties
Simple functions were introduced by Asarin and Maler [3] in the context of reachability
timed games for timed automata.
I Lemma 20 (Simple Functions and Their Properties). A function f : V → R>0 is simple if
either, there exists d ∈ N such that for all ν ∈ V we have f(ν) = d;
or, there exists d ∈ N and c ∈ X such that for all ν ∈ V we have f(ν) = d− ν(c).
We say that a function f : Ŝ → R>0 is regionally simple if for all ` ∈ L, ζ, ζ ′ ∈ R either
i) there exists a d ∈ N such that f(`, ν, ζ ′) = d for all ν ∈ ζ; or ii) there exists d ∈ N and
c ∈ X such that f(`, ν, ζ ′) = d− ν(c) for all ν ∈ ζ. The simple functions have the following
properties.
1. Every simple function is an affine function.
2. Every regionally simple function is a regionally affine function.
3. For ` ∈ L, ζ, ζ ′ ∈ R let D`,ζ,ζ′ = {(`, ν, ζ ′) : [ν] = ζ}. For simple functions f, g :
D`,ζ,ζ′ → R we have that
min{f, g} is either f or g.
max{f, g} is either f or g.
4. Minimum and maximum of a finite set of regionally simple functions is regionally simple.
5. Let B : Ŝ → R be a regionally simple function and G : sˆ → N be a regionally constant
function. Let B⊕α : Ŝ → R as sˆ 7→ pi(sˆ, α) − G(sˆ) + B(sˆ′) where sˆ α−→ sˆ′. We have that
B⊕α is a regionally simple function.
Proof. The proof is in many parts.
1. Trivial.
2. Trivial.
3. Let f, g : D`,ζ,ζ′ → R. There are four cases to consider.
For all ν ∈ ζ we have f(ν) = d1 and g(ν) = d2. If d1 < d2 the min{f, g} = f else
min{f, g} = g. Similarly if d1 < d2 then max{f, g} = g else min{f, g} = f .
For all ν ∈ ζ we have f(ν) = d1 and g(ν) = d2 − ν(c2). Notice that if for some
valuation d1 < d2 − ν(c2) then for all valuations d1 < d2 − ν′(c2) since the difference
between various valuations in a region is strictly less than 1. The lemma follows for
this case from this observation.
For all ν ∈ ζ we have f(ν) = d1 − ν(c1) and g(ν) = d2. This case is analogous to
previous case and omitted.
For all ν ∈ ζ we have f(ν) = d1 − ν(c1) and g(ν) = d2 − ν(c2). If for some region
d1−ν(c1) < d2−ν(c2) then for all valuations this inequality will follow since difference
between various values of clocks from different valuations in a region is strictly smaller
than 1.
4. Similar to property 3.
5. Let B : Ŝ → R be a regionally simple function and G : sˆ → N be a regionally constant
function. Let B⊕α : Ŝ → R as sˆ 7→ pi(sˆ, α)−G(sˆ) +B(sˆ′) where sˆ α−→ sˆ′. Let sˆ = (`, ν, ζ)
and sˆ′ = (`′, ν′, ζ ′). Let g ∈ N be such that G(`, ν, ζ) = g. There are eight cases to
consider.
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B(`′, ·, ζ ′) is ν 7→ d, p(`) = 0 and cα 6∈ ρ(aα). In this case B(`, ·, ζ) = p(`, aα)− g + d
(an integer) is a simple function.
B(`′, ·, ζ ′) is ν 7→ d, p(`) = 0 and cα ∈ ρ(aα) In this case B(`, ·, ζ) = p(`, aα) − g + d
(an integer) is a simple function.
B(`′, ·, ζ ′) is ν 7→ d, p(`) = 1 and cα 6∈ ρ(aα) In this case B(`, ·, ζ) = (bα − ν(cα)) +
p(`, aα)− g + d = K − ν(cα) is a simple function.
B(`′, ·, ζ ′) is ν 7→ d, p(`) = 1 and cα ∈ ρ(aα) In this case B(`, ·, ζ) = (bα − ν(cα)) +
p(`, aα)− g + d = K − ν(cα) is a simple function.
B(`′, ·, ζ ′) is ν 7→ d− ν(c), p(`) = 0 and cα 6∈ ρ(aα) In this case B(`, ·, ζ) = p(`, aα)−
g + d − (ν(c) + bα − ν(cα)) = p(`, aα) − g + d − bα (an integer) is a simple function.
We have ν(c) = ν(cα) as there in only one clock.
B(`′, ·, ζ ′) is ν 7→ d− ν(c), p(`) = 0 and cα ∈ ρ(aα) In this case B(`, ·, ζ) = p(`, aα)−
g + d (an integer) is a simple function.
B(`′, ·, ζ ′) is ν 7→ d − ν(c), p(`) = 1 and cα 6∈ ρ(aα) In this case B(`, ·, ζ) = (bα −
ν(cα)) + p(`, aα)− g+ d− (ν(c) + bα− ν(cα)) = (bα− ν(cα)) + p(`, aα)− g+ d− bα =
K − ν(cα) is a simple function.
B(`′, ·, ζ ′) is ν 7→ d − ν(c), p(`) = 1 and cα ∈ ρ(aα) In this case B(`, ·, ζ) = (bα −
ν(cα)) + p(`, aα)− g + d = K − ν(cα) is a simple function.
The proof is now complete. J
C.3 Proof of Lemma 10
Let T̂(χ, µ) be a zero-player game on the subgraph where strategies of player Max (and Min)
is fixed to RCPSs χ (and µ). We sketch an algorithm ComputeValueZeroPlayer(T, µ, χ)
which returns the solution of optimality equations Opt(T(µ, χ)). Observe that for T(µ, χ)
the unique runs originating from states sˆ0 = (`, ν, ζ) and sˆ′0 = (`, ν′, ζ) with [ν] = [ν′] follow
the same “lasso” after one step, i.e. the unique runs
sˆ0
α1−→ sˆ1 · · · sˆk
(
αk+1−−−→ · · · sˆk+N−1 αk+N−−−−→ sˆk
)∗
and
sˆ′0
α1−→ sˆ′1 · · · sˆ′k
(
αk+1−−−→ · · · sˆ′k+N−1
αk+N−−−−→ sˆ′k
)∗
are such that for sˆi = (`i, νi, ζi) and sˆ′i = (`′i, ν′i, ζ ′i) we have that `i = `′i, ζi = ζ ′i and νi = ν′i
for all i ∈ [1, k +N − 1]. This is so because for one-clock timed automata the successors of
the states sˆ0 = (`, ν, ζ) and sˆ′0 = (`, ν′, ζ) for action α1 = (b, c, a, ζ ′) is the same (`′′, ν′′, ζ ′′)
where ν′′(c) = ν(c) + (b− ν(c)) = b = ν(c) + (b− ν(c)) if c 6∈ ρ(a) and ν′′(c) = 0 otherwise.
Consider the optimality equations for the lasso.
G(sˆ0) = G(sˆ1) = · · · = G(sˆk) = · · ·G(sˆk+N−1) = g say
B(sˆ0) = pi(sˆ0, α1)− g +B(sˆ1)
B(sˆ1) = pi(sˆ1, α2)− g +B(sˆ2)
. . . . . . (3)
B(sˆk) = pi(sˆk, αk+1)− g +B(sˆk+1)
B(sˆk+1) = pi(sˆk+1, αk+1)− g +B(sˆk+3)
. . . . . .
B(sˆk+N−1) = pi(sˆk+N−1, αk+N )− g +B(sˆk)
We show this via an induction on the distance from the region whose biases we fixed
earlier to 0. Let sˆ0
α1−→ sˆ1 α2−→ · · · sˆk be the run such that sˆi = (`i, νi, ζi) and for all states
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B(`k, ·, ζk) = 0. We prove via induction that B(`i, ·, ζi) is a simple function. The base case
follows easily since B(`k, ·, ζk) = 0 which is a simple function. Assume that B(`i, ·, ζi) is
simple we show that B(`i−1, ·, ζi−1) defined as
ν 7→ p(`i−1) · (bα − ν(cα)) + p(`i−1, aα)− g +B(`i, να, ζi)
is also simple where αi = (bα, cα, aα, ζα). This follows form property 5 of Lemma 20.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 11 and Lemma 12
Proof. To prove this lemma it suffices to show that the function
M∗(·, G,B) : sˆ 7→ argmaxlex
α∈Â
{(G(sˆ′), pi(sˆ, α)−G(sˆ) +B(sˆ′)) : sˆ α−→ sˆ′}
is regionally constant. We already have that G is regionally constant. From the property 5
of Lemma 20 it follows that sˆ 7→ pi(sˆ, α)−G(sˆ)+B(sˆ′)) is regionally simple. Note that since
maximum (Property 3 of Lemma 20 of any finite set of simple functions over a region is one
of the functions from the set, it follows that the set M∗(·, G,B) is regionally constant. The
proof for the Lemma 12 is similar and hence omitted. J
C.5 Proof of Theorem 13
The following two Lemmas together with finiteness of regionally constant positional strategies
give the proof of Theorem 13. The proofs of these lemma are similar to Lemma 16 and hence
omitted.
I Lemma 21. Let (G,B) = Opt(T(χ)). If χ′ = ImproveMaxStrategy(T, χ,G,B) then
(G′B′) = Opt(T(χ′)) is such that (G′, B′) > (G,B) and if χ′ 6= χ then (G′, B′) > (G,B).
I Lemma 22. Let (G,B) = Opt(T(χ, µ)). If µ′ = ImproveMinStrategy(T, µ,G,B) then
(G′B′) = Opt(T(χ, µ′)) is such that (G′, B′) 6 (G,B) and if µ′ 6= µ then (G′, B′) < (G,B).
D Proofs from Section 5
We prove our undecidability result using a reduction from two-counter machine. A two-
counter machine M is a tuple (L,C) where L = {`0, `1, . . . , `n} is the set of instructions—
including a distinguished terminal instruction `n called HALT—and C = {c1, c2} is the set
of two counters. The instructions L are one of the following types:
1. (increment c) `i : c := c+ 1; goto `k,
2. (decrement c) `i : c := c− 1; goto `k,
3. (zero-check c) `i : if (c > 0) then goto `k else goto `m,
4. (Halt) `n : HALT.
where c ∈ C, `i, `k, `m ∈ L. A configuration of a two-counter machine is a tuple (l, c, d)
where l ∈ L is an instruction, and c, d are natural numbers that specify the value of counters
c1 and c2, respectively. The initial configuration is (`0, 0, 0). A run of a two-counter machine
is a (finite or infinite) sequence of configurations 〈k0, k1, . . .〉 where k0 is the initial configura-
tion, and the relation between subsequent configurations is governed by transitions between
respective instructions. The run is a finite sequence if and only if the last configuration is
the terminal instruction `n. Note that a two-counter machine has exactly one run starting
from the initial configuration. The halting problem for a two-counter machine asks whether
its unique run ends at the terminal instruction `n. It is well known ([20]) that the halting
problem for two-counter machines is undecidable.
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Figure 5 WD11 redrawn with location prices from {1, 0,−1}. Every location has a self loop with
the guard x2, x3 = 1, reset x2, x3, which is not shown here for conciseness. The curly edge from B
to C is shown below. The mean-payoff incurred in one transit from A to A via E is 14 . If Min
makes no error, this is 0.
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Figure 6 Simulation to increment counter C1, mean cost is ε for error ε. As seen in Figure 5,
the widgets WI12 and WI11 can be redrawn with location prices in {0, 1,−1}.
D.1 Proofs for undecidability of mean-payoff (per-transition) games
Simulation of increment instruction.: The module to increment C1 is given in Fig. 6.
Again, we start at `k with x1 = 15c17c2 , x2 = 0 and x3 = 0. Let
1
5c17c2 be called as xold.
A time of 1 − xold is spent at `k. Let the time spent at I be denoted xnew. To correctly
increment counter 1, xnew must be xold5 . No time is spent at Check. Player Max can either
continue simulation of the next instruction, or can enter one of the widgets WI11,WI12 to
verify if xnew is indeed xold5 .
If player Min makes an error by elapsing a time xold5 + ε, then player Max chooses the
widget WI11. It can be seen that the cost of going from A to E once in WI11 is 5ε. The mean
cost incurred by Min in going from A to A through E once, when Max chooses WI11 is hence
ε. Similarly, if Min makes an error by elapsing a time xold5 − ε, then player Max chooses the
widget WI12. The mean cost incurred in one transit from A to A through E in WI12 is again
ε. If Min makes no simulation error, then the mean cost incurred is 0.
Simulation of Zero-check.: Fig. 7 shows the module for zero-check instruction for counter
C2. `k is a no time elapse location, from where, player Min chooses one of the locations
Checkc2=0 or Checkc2 6=0. Both these are player Max locations, and player Max can either
continue the simulation, or can go to the check widgets W=02 or W
6=0
2 to verify the correctness
of player Min’s choice. The widgets W=02 and W
6=0
2 are given in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively.
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Figure 7 Widget WZ2 simulating zero-check for C2
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Consider the case when player Min guessed that C2 is zero, and entered the location
Checkc2=0 in Fig. 7. Let us assume that player Max verifies player Min’s guess by
entering W=02 (Fig. 8). No time is spent in the initial location A of W=02 . We are
therefore at B with x1 = 15c17c2 = xold and x2, x3 = 0. In case c1 = c2 = 0, we can
directly go to the F state, and keep looping there forever, incurring mean cost 0. If
that is not the case, player Min has to prove his claim right, by multiplying x1 with 5
repeatedly, till x1 becomes 1; clearly, this is possible iff c2 = 0. The loop between B
and Check precisely does this: each time player Min spends a time xdelay in B, player
Max can verify that xdelay = 4xold by going to WD11 or WD12 or come back to B. No
time is elapsed in Check. Finally, if x1 = 1, we can go to F , and player Min achieves
his objective. However, if C2 was non-zero, then x1 will never reach 1 after repeatedly
multiplying x1 with 5; in this case, at some point, the edge from Check to C will be
enabled. In this case, the infinite loop between C and T , will lead to a mean cost greater
than 0.
Consider now the case when player Min guessed that C2 is non-zero, and hence entered
the location Checkc2 6=0 in Fig. 7. Let us assume now that player Max enters W
6=0
2 (Fig. 9)
to verify player Min’s guess. Similar to W=02 , no time is spent at location A of W
6=0
2 ,
and the clock values at B are x1 = 15c17c2 = xold and x2, x3 = 0. If c1 = c2 = 0, then
x1 = 1, in which case, the location D is reached, from where, the loop between D,T is
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Figure 9 Widget W6=02
taken incurring a mean cost greater than 0.
If that is not the case, player Min, to prove his claim, repeatedly multiplies x1 by 5 using
the loop between B and Check. x1 becomes 1 iff c2 = 0. Once x1 becomes 1, the edge
from B to D will be enabled. In this case, the infinite loop between D and T , will lead
to a mean cost greater than 0. Note that once x1 becomes 1, player Min can also wait
in B and transit to Check. However, due to the guard on the edge from B to Check, the
delay at B will be less than 4xold, (when x1 = 1, x1 = xold = 15c17c2 = 1, c1 = c2 = 0)
say 4xold − ε in which case too player Max can go to WD11 or WD12 and the mean cost
will be ε. If C2 was non-zero, then x1 will never reach 1 after repeatedly multiplying x1
with 5; in this case, at some point, x1 will be greater than 1 and the edge from B to F
will be enabled and player Min can achieve his objective by moving to F .
Correctness of the construction. On entry into the location `n (for HALT instruction),
we reset clock x1 to 0; from `n, we go to a state F with price 1, with a self loop that checks
x1 = 1, and resets x1.
1. Assume that the two counter machine halts. If player Min simulates all the instructions
correctly, he will incur a mean cost > 0, by either reaching the F after `n : when player
Min does not cheat, player Max has no incentive to enter any of the check widgets, he
will just let the computation continue, till the Halt location is reached. This will incur a
mean cost > 0. If player Min makes an error in his computation, player Max can always
enter an appropriate widget, making the mean cost > 0. In summary, if the two counter
machine halts, then player Min has no strategy to achieve his goal (mean pay off 6 0).
2. Assume that the two counter machine does not halt.
If player Min simulates all the instructions correctly, and if player Max never enters
a check widget, then player Min incurs cost 0, since all locations in the main modules
have price 0. Even if player Max enters some widget, the mean cost of player Min
is still 0, since no errors were made by Min. However, if player Min makes an error,
player Max can enter a check widget, ensuring that the mean cost is > 0. Thus, if the
two counter machine does not halt, player Min has a strategy (by making no errors)
to achieve mean cost 0.
In summary, if the two counter machine does not halt, player Min has a strategy to
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achieve his goal, and vice-versa.
Thus, player Min incurs a mean cost 6 0 iff he chooses the strategy of faithfully simulat-
ing the two counter machine, when the machine does not halt. When the machine halts,
the mean cost incurred by player Min is more than 0 irrespective of whether he makes a
simulation error or not. J
MPG(T, r) problem, r > 0
Now we argue that the MPG(T, r) problem is undecidable for PTGAs with > 3 clocks,
having only binary location prices and no edge prices, for r = 13 . We note that in the
previous undecidability result, all the modules apart from the WD11,WD12,WI11 and WI12
use binary location prices. Thus we now give here these modules with only binary prices.
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Figure 10WD11 here has locations with binary price rates. All locations have a self loop x3 = 1?,
reset x3. This module is chosen by the Max player when the error made by Min player during the
decrement operation is ε. The curly edge from C to D is shown by the path below. The mean-payoff
incurred in one transit from A to A via F is 13 +

15 . If Min makes no error, the cost is
1
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Figure 11WD12 here has locations with binary price rates. All locations have a self loop x3 = 1?,
reset x3. This module is chosen by the Max player when the error made by Min player during the
decrement operation is −ε. The curly edge from C to D is shown by the path below. The mean-
payoff incurred in one transit from A to A via F is 13 +

15 . If Min makes no error, it is
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Fig. 10 shows the module WD11 while Fig. 11 shows the module WD12 with location
prices 0 and 1. The modules WI11 and WI12 can also be similarly made with only binary
prices. The module WD11 is chosen by the Max player when the error made by the Min
player while simulating the decrement counter C1 operation is ε. The moduleWD12 is chosen
by the Max player when the error made by the Min player is −ε. When no error is made by
the Min player, the mean cost WD11 is 13 while the cost in the presence of an error is
1
3 +

15 .
The modules for zerocheck (Figure 7) can be used as they are. In case an error is made
in the guess, the meanpayoff incurred by shuttling between locations C, T (Figure 8 ) or
D,T (Figure 9 ) is 12 >
1
3 .
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D.2 Proofs for undecidability of mean-payoff (per-time-unit) games
Mean-payoff game (per time unit) has been studied in [10]. The mean-payoff (per time unit)
of a play is defined as the long-run average of cost per time unit. Formally, the mean payoff
of a play Run(s, µ.χ) = σ = (`0, ν0)
(d0,a0)−−−−→ (`1, ν1) (d1,a1)−−−−→ · · · starting from a state s in
which players Min and Max play according to µ and χ respectively is
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=0(p(`i, a) + p(`1) · ti)∑n
i=0 ti
.
We refine the undecidability result in [10] by showing the following result.
I Theorem 23. The mean-payoff problem MPG(T, r) is undecidable for PTGA T with 3
clocks having location-wise price-rates pi(`) ∈ {0, 1,−1} for all ` ∈ L and r = 0. Moreover,
it is undecidable for binary-priced T with 3 clocks and r > 0.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 14, this proof also involves reduction from the non-halting
problem of two counter machines.
Proof. We first show the undecidability of MPG(T, 0) with location prices {1, 0,−1} and
no edge prices. We prove the result by reducing the non-halting problem of 2 counter
machines. Given a two counter machineM, we construct a PTGA Γ with 3 clocks x1, x2, x3,
and arbitrary location prices, but no edge prices, and show that player Min has a winning
strategy iffM does not halt.
We specify a module for each instruction of the two counter machine. On entry into a
module, we have x1 = 15c17c2 , x2 = 0 and x3 = 0, where c1, c2 are the values of counters
C1, C2. We construct the PTGA Γ whose building blocks are the modules for instructions.
The role of player Min is to faithfully simulate the two counter machine, by choosing ap-
propriate delays to adjust the clocks to reflect changes in counter values. Player Max will
have the opportunity to verify that player Min did not cheat while simulating the machine.
We shall now present modules for increment, decrement and zero check instructions. For
conciseness of the figures, we present here modules using arbitrary prices. However, we can
redraw these with extra locations and edges using only the location prices from {1, 0,−1},
as was done in the case of Theorem 14.
Simulation of decrement instruction. The module to simulate the decrement of counter
C1 is given in Figure 12. We enter location `k with x1 = 15c17c2 , x2 = 0 and x3 = 0. Lets
denote by xold the value 15c17c2 . To correctly decrement C1, player Min should choose a
delay of 4xold at location `k. At location Check, there is no time elapse. Player Max has
three possibilities : (i) to go to `k+1, or (ii) to enter the widget WD11, or (iii) to enter the
widget WD12. If player Min makes an error, and delays 4xold + ε or 4xold − ε at `k (ε > 0),
then player Max can enter one of the widgets and punish player Min. Player Max enters
widget WD11 if the error made by player Min is of the form 4xold+ ε at `k and enters widget
WD12 if the error made by player Min is of the form 4xold − ε at `k. Let us examine the
widget WD11.
When we enter WD11 for the first time, we have x1 = xold + 4xold + ε, x2 = 4xold + ε
and x3 = 0. In WD11, the cost of going once from location A to E is 5ε. Also, when we get
back to A after going through the loop once, the clock values with which we entered WD11
are restored; thus, each time, we come back to A, we restore the starting values with which
we enter WD11. The third clock is really useful for this purpose only. The total time elapsed
in 3 time units; at A, the value of clock x3 is 0 and the transition from E to A is enabled
when x3 = 3. Hence the mean cost of transiting from A to A through E is 5ε3 . In a similar
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Figure 12 Simulation to decrement counter C1, mean cost is 5ε3 for error ε
way, it can be checked that the mean cost of transiting from A to A through E in widget
WD12 is 5ε3 when player Min chooses a delay 4xold − ε at `k. Thus, if player Min makes a
simulation error, player Max can always choose to go to one of the widgets, and ensure that
the mean pay-off is not 6 0. Note however that when ε = 0, then player Min will always
achieve his objective: the mean pay-off will be 0.
0
`k
0
I
0
Check
[x3 = 0]
0
`k+1
x1=1
{x1}
x161
{x3}
{x2}
−5
A
−1
B
5
C
0
D
0
E
x3 = 3, {x3}
x1=1
{x1}
x2=2
{x2}
x2=1
{x2}
x1=2
{x1}W
I1 1
5
A
1
B
−5
C
0
D
0
E
x3 = 3, {x3}
x1=1
{x1}
x2=2
{x2}
x2=1
{x2}
x1=2
{x1}W
I1 2
Figure 13 Simulation to increment counter C1, mean cost is 5ε3 for error ε
Simulation of increment instruction.: The module to increment C1 is given in Fig. 13.
Again, we start at `k with x1 = 15c17c2 , x2 = 0 and x3 = 0. Let
1
5c17c2 be called as xold.
A time of 1 − xold is spent at `k. Let the time spent at I be denoted xnew. To correctly
increment counter 1, xnew must be xold5 . No time is spent at Check. Player Max can either
continue simulation of the next instruction, or can enter one of the widgets WI11,WI12 to
verify if xnew is indeed xold5 .
If player Min makes an error by elapsing a time xold5 + ε, then player Max chooses the
widget WI11. It can be seen that the cost of going from A to E once in WI11 is 5ε and the
time spent in moving from A to A through E is 3 time units. Hence the mean cost incurred
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Figure 14 Widget WZ2 simulating zero-check for C2
by Min in going from A to A through E once, when Max chooses WI11 is hence 5ε3 . Similarly,
if Min makes an error by elapsing a time xold5 − ε, then player Max chooses the widget WI12.
The mean cost incurred in one transit from A to A through E in WI12 is again 5ε3 . If Min
makes no simulation error, then the mean cost incurred is 0.
Simulation of Zero-check.: Figure 14 shows the module for zero-check instruction for
counter C2. `k is a no time elapse location, from where player Min chooses one of the
locations Checkc2=0 or Checkc2 6=0. Both these are player Max locations, and player Max
can either continue the simulation, or can go to the check widgets W=02 or W
6=0
2 to verify
the correctness of player Min’s choice. The widgets W=02 and W
6=0
2 are given in Figure 15
and Figure 16 respectively.
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Figure 15 Widget W=02
Consider the case when player Min guessed that C2 is zero, and entered the location
Checkc2=0 in Figure 14. Let us assume that player Max verifies player Min’s guess by
entering W=02 (Figure 15). No time is spent in the initial location A of W=02 . We are
therefore at B with x1 = 15c17c2 = xold and x2, x3 = 0. In case c1 = c2 = 0, we can
directly go to the F state, and keep looping there forever, incurring mean cost 0. If
that is not the case, player Min has to prove his claim right, by multiplying x1 with 5
repeatedly, till x1 becomes 1; clearly, this is possible iff c2 = 0. The loop between B
and Check precisely does this: each time player Min spends a time xdelay in B, player
Max can verify that xdelay = 4xold by going to WD11 or WD12 or come back to B. No
time is elapsed in Check. Finally, if x1 = 1, we can go to F , and player Min achieves
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Figure 16 Widget W 6=02
his objective. However, if C2 was non-zero, then x1 will never reach 1 after repeatedly
multiplying x1 with 5; in this case, at some point, the edge from Check to C will be
enabled. In this case, the infinite loop between C and T , will lead to a mean cost of 1.
Consider now the case when player Min guessed that C2 is non-zero, and hence entered
the location Checkc2 6=0 in Fig. 14. Let us assume now that player Max enters W
6=0
2
(Fig. 16) to verify player Min’s guess. Similar to W=02 , no time is spent at location A of
W6=02 , and the clock values at B are x1 = 15c17c2 = xold and x2, x3 = 0. If c1 = c2 = 0,
then x1 = 1, in which case, the location D is reached, from where, the loop between
D,T is taken incurring a mean cost of 1. If that is not the case, player Min repeatedly
multiplies x1 by 5 using the loop between B and Check. x1 becomes 1 iff c2 = 0. Once x1
becomes 1, the edge from B to D will be enabled. In this case, the infinite loop between
D and T , will lead to a mean cost of 1. Note that if once x1 becomes 1, player Min could
also wait in B and transit to Check. However, due to the guard on the edge from B to
Check, the delay at B will be less than 4xold, where xold = 1. Say the delay is 4xold − ε
in which case too player Max can go to WD11 or WD12 and the mean cost will be greater
than 0. If C2 was non-zero, then x1 will never reach 1 after repeatedly multiplying x1
with 5; in this case, at some point, x1 will be greater than 1 and the edge from B to F
will be enabled and player Min can achieve its objective by moving to F .
Correctness of the construction. On entry into the location `n (for HALT instruction),
we reset clock x1 to 0; from `n, we go to a state F with price 1, with a self loop that checks
x1 = 1, and resets x1.
1. Assume that the two counter machine halts. If player Min simulates all the instructions
correctly, he will incur a mean cost > 0, by either reaching the F after `n : when player
Min does not cheat, player Max has no incentive to enter any of the check widgets, he
will just let the computation continue, till the Halt location is reached. This will incur a
mean cost > 0. If player Min makes an error in his computation, player Max can always
enter an appropriate widget, making the mean cost > 0. In summary, if the two counter
machine halts, then player Min has no strategy to achieve his goal (mean pay off 6 0).
2. Assume that the two counter machine does not halt.
If player Min simulates all the instructions correctly, and if player Max never enters
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a check widget, then player Min incurs cost 0, since all locations in the main modules
(modules simulating decrement counters, increment counters and zero check) have
price 0. Even if player Max enters some widget, the mean cost of player Min is still
0, since no errors were made by Min. However, if player Min makes an error, player
Max can enter a check widget, ensuring that the mean cost is > 0. Thus, if the two
counter machine does not halt, player Min has a strategy (by making no errors) to
achieve mean cost 0.
In summary, if the two counter machine does not halt, player Min has a strategy to
achieve his goal, and vice-versa.
Thus, player Min incurs a mean cost 6 0 iff he chooses the strategy of faithfully simulat-
ing the two counter machine, when the machine does not halt. When the machine halts,
the mean cost incurred by player Min is more than 0 irrespective of whether he makes a
simulation error or not. J
Now we argue that the MPG(T, r) (r > 0) problem is undecidable for PTGAs with > 3
clocks, having only binary location prices and no edge prices. We note that in the previous
undecidability result, all the modules apart from the WD11,WD12,WI11 and WI12 use binary
location prices. As in Figure 11 and Figure 10, these modules can be constructed easily.
The moduleWD11 is chosen by the Max player when the error made by the Min player while
simulating the decrement counter C1 operation is ε. The module WD12 is chosen by the
Max player when the error made by the Min player is −ε. J
